Federal Reserve : The evolution of Fed communications by Doug Campbell
The Fed is evidently capable of 
confounding people — absolutely
flummoxing them — by saying what it
plans to do, then doing it, and then
promptly announcing what it had done.
— Dow Jones News Service 
Feb. 7, 1994
J
ust before 11 a.m., Feb. 4, 1994, 
the Federal Reserve released 
a three-paragraph statement. The
Federal Open Market Committee, Fed
Chairman Alan Greenspan said 
in part, had decided to “increase 
slightly the degree of pressure on
reserve positions. The action was
expected to be associated with 
a small increase in short-term
money market interest rates.”
Though vague by today’s 
standards, the release’s import
was clear. It marked the first time
the Fed announced a change in
monetary policy as soon as it was
made. Until the winter of 1994,
indications of the central bank’s
stance on the fed funds rate 
were indicated primarily through 
operations in the money market.
The Feb. 4 release was in fact the
beginning of an evolution — if 
not quite a revolution — in 
Fed communications.
Why did the Fed keep such a
veil of secrecy over its formulation
and stance of monetary policy for so
long, and why has it taken more steps
toward openness recently? Almost all
the main issues are laid out in FOMC
transcripts from that two-day
February meeting. During that land-
mark session, FOMC members
debated the pros and cons of immedi-
ately announcing their policy stance,
wondering aloud about the implica-
tions for the Fed’s flexibility and
credibility. Of paramount concern was
the prospect that the FOMC would be
misunderstood, no matter what it did.
Message Moratorium
The Fed has always found ways to
communicate with the public. But until
recently, few of those ways were terribly
direct, and none very immediate.
Beginning in 1935, with the 
modern-day creation of the FOMC,
the Fed issued brief summaries of its 
policy decisions, called the Records of
Policy Actions, on an annual basis. 
At the same time, it kept minutes of
policy deliberations for internal use.
In 1967 came the release of the
FOMC minutes, 90 days after each
meeting. Also published with a 90-day
lag were the Records of Policy
Actions. In 1975, the lag in release of
minutes was shortened to 45 days, and
then in 1976 to 30 days.
Other communication vehicles
included the chairman’s semiannual
reports to Congress, the so-called
Humphrey-Hawkins Report. Since
1983 the Beige Book has publicly sum-
marized economic conditions in each
of the 12 Federal Reserve districts
throughout the country. Finally, there
were speeches by Fed governors and
Reserve bank presidents.
But announcements immediately
following FOMC meetings simply
didn’t exist. The main way the Fed dis-
closed its policy actions was through
open market operations — chiefly,
daily repurchase agreements in which
the New York Fed’s trading desk
pumps up or drains reserves of the
nation’s banking system. Even there,
information was limited: Only the
amount of the repurchase agreements
transacted was released, with nothing
about rates, prices, or size of 
propositions for the overnight loans.
FOMC members justified this
shroud as key to their effectiveness.
They even spelled it out at their 
meeting on June 20, 1967. “For years,
Federal Reserve officials argued that
immediate release of policy decisions
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In a pivotal 1994
meeting, Fed leaders
debated whether 
to open up about
their actions
Former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan, seen 
here testifying before Congress in
February 1994, led a movement
toward greater openness in 
Fed communications.
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and policy implementation more 
costly and difficult,” said St. Louis 
Fed President William Poole in a 
2005 speech, referring to the 1967
meeting. “Creating these effects
through disclosure would obviously 
be inconsistent with the Fed’s public
responsibilities.”
Michael Woodford, a Columbia
University economist who has studied
Fed communications, suspects another
motivation as well. “My guess is that
bureaucrats in most organizations
would prefer not to have to explain to
outsiders what they’re doing.”
Views on how much the Fed should
say in public about its formulation and
stance of monetary policy began to
change in the early 1990s. Politicians
were pressuring the Fed to open up.
Henry Gonzalez, then-House Banking
Committee chairman, was demanding
that the Fed make public details of its
deliberations on monetary policy.
Motivating some of this pressure was
the 1993 discovery that the Fed had
kept unedited transcripts of its FOMC
meetings since 1976.
Facing these developments, FOMC
members decided to release lightly
edited versions of those transcripts
with a five-year lag. But it wasn’t
enough to satisfy those seeking more
communication. Milton Friedman, a
frequent critic of the Fed, was one of
the leaders in the early 1990s in calling
for openness. He noted that a cottage
industry of Fed watchers had sprouted
up on Wall Street, reading the tea
leaves of repurchase agreements and
opaque speeches.
“Prompt release of the directive
would deprive the Fed watchers of
their employment but would improve
the operation of the money market by
ensuring that prompt information 
was available to all participants alike,”
Friedman wrote in a Wall Street Journal
commentary with his longtime collab-
orator Anna Schwartz. “It would 
also increase the effectiveness of 
the Fed’s operations, since better
informed market participants would
have an incentive to speed the attain-
ment of the Fed’s objectives.”
The Debate
So it was that FOMC members began
to air their positions on the merits of
opening up. Members were steadfast
that they wouldn’t bow to political
pressure. At the same time, they were
willing to reconsider FOMC commu-
nications with a view toward making it
easier for the public to understand
their stance on monetary policy.
The Feb. 3-4, 1994, FOMC meeting
was widely anticipated as a possible
landmark occasion, both inside and
outside the Fed. Besides the communi-
cation issue, it had been five years
since the last rate increase, and two
since any move whatsoever. Afew days
earlier, Greenspan had strongly indi-
cated in Congressional testimony that
a rate hike was afoot. Transcripts from
the meeting reveal a lively discussion,
one in which members fretted about
preserving flexibility while living up 
to their responsibilities.
Greenspan’s views on an announce-
ment were already known to members.
He favored an immediate public 
statement but wanted to make clear
that it would not set precedent. 
He opened the monetary policy section
of the Feb. 3 gathering by outlining 
his case. “I am particularly concerned
that if we choose to move tomorrow
[meaning, tighten monetary policy],
we make certain that there is no ambi-
guity about our move,” Greenspan
said. “I would very much like to have
the permission of the committee to
announce that we’re doing it and to
state that the announcement is an
extraordinary event.” 
In addition, Greenspan argued,
nothing was forcing the Fed to make
this announcement a regular occur-
rence. “The issue of whether
something is precedential or not is
under our control. We don’t have to
announce our policy moves; there’s
nothing forcing us to do so, and I 
cannot believe that there will be 
legislation requiring that.”
Richard Syron, Boston Fed 
president, also favored a public
announcement on the upcoming policy
move. But he wondered if the reaction
would serve as a guide on whether to
make future such announcements.
“My own forecast would be that this
would pull the teeth in a longer-term
sense, which we are not resolving now,
on a lot of these issues about disclo-
sure. I know these issues wouldn’t all
go away.”
If there was a precedent to be 
set, Greenspan said, it was that
announcements would be expected
when the Fed had acted after a long
time of leaving policy unchanged.
“What I’m saying is that the first 
time we move the funds rate after this
extended period, we are hitting a
‘gong.’”
San Francisco Fed President Robert
Parry was the first to speak in favor of 
a commitment to continued announce-
ments: “We ought to have a discussion
as quickly as is feasible about the 
desirability of similar statements in 
the future because I think some of us
believe there is some advantage to
doing it on a continued basis.”
Robert Forrestal, president of 
the Atlanta Fed, disagreed about the 
need for regular announcements. 
His suggestion was to make explicit in 
the announcement that further
announcements would not necessarily
be forthcoming. “I have a real concern
that there’s a risk that we’re going 
to be pushed by pressures — not neces-
sarily legislation but other pressures — 
to make this an ongoing operating 
procedure. If that’s the case, I think 
we would lose some flexibility,”
Forrestal said. “If we can draft a 
statement that clearly indicates this is
not a precedent but a one-time 
event because of the peculiar circum-
stances, then I would support your
[Greenspan’s] recommendation.”
Worries about setting precedent
aside, some members noted that 
an announcement carried certain
advantages, the main one being that
the FOMC could better control the 
message of the day. Jerry Jordan,
Cleveland Fed president, said that
without an announcement, the press
and public might wrongly conclude
that the committee was trying to curb
growth, when in fact such price 
stabilization efforts were also pro-
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tightening] as a growth-sustaining
move is extremely important. Only by
putting out a statement can we get
that message out there, or at least
make an effort to say that this is not an
antigrowth move but one that is
designed to enhance the longevity of
this expansion.”
Jordan’s comment gets to the heart 
of what was really going on in the 
boardroom that day. Many FOMC 
members were interested in transparency
because they believed it would make
monetary policy more effective. 
By announcing why they acted, members
could influence the public’s expectations
about the future course of inflation —
and the Fed’s ability to deal with it.
That may not sound like such a 
radical idea in 2007. But for the Fed in
1994, paying attention to public 
expectations was still relatively new. 
It was former Chairman Paul Volcker
who first implemented the practice.
Starting in 1979, the Fed began a
famous fight against inflation, slowing
the growth of the money supply so as
to bat down rising prices. It took five
years of mostly tight monetary policy
for the public to finally believe that
the Fed was serious and committed
about fighting inflation.
By 1994, open communication was
seen as a tool to further manage 
expectations about the future path 
of interest rates, and by extension
enhance the Fed’s hard-won credibility.
As economist Woodford put it in a
2005 paper: “Better information on
the part of market participants 
about central-bank actions and inten-
tions should increase the degree to
which central-bank policy decisions
can actually affect these expectations,
and so increase the effectiveness 
of monetary stabilization policy.” 
That’s why it was so important to
Jordan that any statement include an
explanation of the Fed’s rationale for
raising rates.
Around the Table
The debate was not entirely linear, bop-
ping back and forth between the issues
as members were polled. Thomas
Hoenig, Kansas City Fed president,
revisited the “precedent” problem,
arguing that there was no way around
one being set. Without saying whether
he favored an announcement in the
first place, he argued that doing so
would essentially back the FOMC into 
a corner: “I have a hard time under-
standing how this would not be
precedential. ... I think it will  be diffi-
cult from a credibility point of view to
argue against announcing in the future
should we want to make that argument.”
Greenspan responded: “We’re saying
there are different types of changes
[requiring statements]. For example,
in 1979 there was a major change.
Chairman Volcker and his staff went
out and had a big press conference.
There are certain individual events
where periodically the Federal 
Reserve has made special statements;
I’m merely stipulating that this is one
of them. Frankly, with the exception of
the stock market crash in October
1987, it’s the first one since I’ve been
here.” If the committee four weeks
later raised rates again, “I don’t see any
reason why a statement would be
appropriate at that later time,”
Greenspan said. In the end, it was a
question of whether the FOMC could
control the issue and, in Greenspan’s
view, it could.
Thomas Melzer, president of 
the St. Louis Fed, envisioned some
potentially embarrassing media 
coverage with an announcement 
that went out of its way to say it was a
one-time thing. “I think there is a 
risk of a headline along the lines of 
‘In an unprecedented move, the Fed
announced ... saying it wasn’t setting 
a precedent,’” Melzer said.
And then came an animated back and
forth between Melzer and Greenspan.
Melzer: “Are we obligated to say  
anything about the vote, for
example? I’m not sure. Again, I’d
prefer just to say what the action
was. It’s a decision of the com-
mittee, but if we get into
disclosing the vote, that begins
to set other types of precedents
that could be relevant when we
get to the point of deciding this 
issue on a permanent basis.”
Greenspan:  “Look, the main 
issue here is that, as far as I’m 
concerned, I would like us 
to stand up and be counted. 
We are the central bank and we 
are making a major move.”
Melzer: “Right, I agree.”
Greenspan:  “And to do it in 
an ambiguous manner I think is
unbecoming of this institution.”
How to get around the precedent
problem? Greenspan suggested that a
partial solution was to have the
announcement made by him, not 
by the committee, a proposal that
prompted a few jokes. “Now, if 
we decide to do it on a permanent
basis, then it’s a committee issue,”
Greenspan said. “But marginally it’s of
a less precedential nature if I do it.”
Edward Boehne, president of the
Philadelphia Fed, responded: “If it
doesn’t work, the committee could fire
the chairman!”
Parry chimed in: “That’s right.”
“Well, maybe we ought to bring 
that issue up before the vote!”
Greenspan said amid laughter.
AConsensus Builds
A few participants spoke up in
favor of the statement, particularly if
it came with some sort of “one-off”
language. Joan Lovett, manager for
domestic operations with the New
York Fed, put it this way: “I think that
it can’t be harmful ...  It tells everybody
what’s happening and it leaves no
room for ambiguity, and if it’s phrased
the way you are suggesting, it’s not 
setting a stage for people to have
expectations of an announcement
every time there is a policy change
going forward.”
Gary Stern, president of the
Minneapolis Fed, made the case that
an announcement would level the 
playing field in terms of market 
participants understanding the Fed’s
message: “I happen to agree with those
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precedential and from my perspective
that’s fine because I think we’ve been
in an awkward situation where we have
kind of acknowledged that people 
in the markets get the news and 
the signal immediately, but for 
those who are not close to the markets 
the news kind of dribbles out depend-
ing on how quickly they read the 
financial press or consult other sources 
of information.”
Richmond Fed President Al
Broaddus was among those arguing in
favor of a release: “There are risks of not
doing this [making a statement]. If there
were any confusion tomorrow going
into the weekend or this thing gets
played out in the New York Times
on Saturday and Sunday or on 
CNN, I think we would have a real 
mess.” And Dallas Fed President 
Robert McTeer went so far as to say, 
“I personally wouldn’t mind seeing it
become a precedent.”
The afternoon was turning dark and
it was time to wrap up. They would
gather again the next day at 9 a.m.
Adjourning the meeting, Greenspan
warned against leaks of the day’s dis-
cussion, alluding to the embarrassing
release of notes from a fall 1993 confer-
ence call to Rep. Gonzalez. “I just
beseech you to be as careful as you 
possibly can and not even tell your
doorman where you’ve been!”
Nobody leaked, and the next day the
Fed released an announcement just as
planned to an unsuspecting public. It
was, as the Associated Press described,
a bolt from the blue: “In a rare display of
openness, the central bank issued a
three-paragraph statement Friday stat-
ing it had begun to clamp down on
credit ... The disclosure took the guess-
work out of Fed-watching and caught
the financial markets off guard. For 
analysts accustomed to appraising 
subtle shifts in money market interest
rates for clues to the Fed’s thinking, the
news release was a bombshell.”
More Changes
Despite the initial surprise, market
watchers quickly adjusted to the Fed’s
new openness. More moves toward
transparency followed. In 1995, FOMC
members agreed to release all future
transcripts of their meetings with a
five-year lag. On July 6, 1995, the
FOMC for the first time mentioned
the actual federal funds rate, saying
the policy action reflected “a decline
of 25 basis points.” On Jan. 31, 1996,
came the first mention of the actual
federal funds target rate.
Such announcements were forth-
coming every time the FOMC
initiated a policy action. In 1999,
announcements became standard
practice, whether the target rate was
changed or not. From that year on,
there have been immediate announce-
ments following each FOMC meeting.
The language contained in these
regular announcements has also 
grown more precise. After meetings 
in which there were shifts in FOMC
views about the future, announce-
ments included a “balance of risks”
assessment — whether the risks 
were greatest with regards to either
inflation or growth. In 2003, the com-
mittee began adding an additional
sentence about the future, such as
whether present policy actions were
likely to be continued. The May 2004
FOMC announcement, for example,
explained that  “the committee
believes that policy accommodation
can be removed at a pace that is likely 
to be measured.”
More than a decade after the pivotal
FOMC meeting, there is no looking
back. “On the whole it’s been a 
successful experiment,” says Columbia
economist Woodford. “People in the
institution have come to understand
that there are advantages to the insti-
tution of being clearer about what the
policy targets are and what the Fed is
trying to achieve in the markets.”
Beyond policy announcements,
FOMC minutes now are usually
released three weeks after a meeting.
In addition, each open market opera-
tion is followed with a detailed report
of the transaction, including its
amount, the sizes of propositions, and
the stop-out rates and ranges. All of it
has added up to a considerably more
transparent Fed.
Not that there are no longer any
surprises. As recently as 2004, five-year
Treasury notes jumped 25 basis points
— the largest swing in more than a
decade — immediately after an FOMC
announcement that had been widely
anticipated. No policy action was
taken that day. What wasn’t anticipat-
ed was the FOMC’s move to eliminate
wording in its announcement that had
indicated no rate changes would be
happening “for a considerable period.”
The Fed had essentially signaled 
that it was now closer to lifting interest
rates than it had been before, which is
why the Treasury notes rose with 
the announcement.
Even now, after more than a decade
of moves toward greater transparency,
the Fed remains capable of confusing
the markets. But Woodford says that
FOMC communications are likely to
become even more explicit, not less.
“There’s still a search for even 
better and perhaps more flexible ways
to communicate what the outlook 
for future policy is,” Woodford says. 
“The recent experience is that it can
be useful to talk about that.” RF
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